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Abstract: Environmental governance aims at sustaining earth‘s ecosystem to be able to cater for 
the needs of generation unborn as well as protect nature from extinction. However, five decades 
of environmental governance have yielded abysmal results due to lack of strong institutions to 
carry out the environmental mandate. Moreover, there is lack of commitment towards 
environmental negotiations and compliance. There is also little efforts to enforce agreements and 
regulations while little incentive exists for adherence to these agreements. This paper therefore 
presents a brief exposition on environmental governance by elucidating its main dimensions and 
challenges; and proceeds to offer a way forward for environmental governance with insights from 
multi-level governance, taking into consideration the challenges and (political ecology and 
ecological economics) critiques of the mainstream. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The growth in human populations and industrial economies has led to an 
unprecedented decline in the natural environment. This phenomenon has 
informed the pursuit of environmental management regimes since 1949 when 
the first international effort to arrest environmental degradation was made 
through the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and 
Utilisation of Resources (Pelletier 2000). But mainstream environmental 
governance took off in 1972 when the first UN decadal mega-conference on the 
environment was held.  Since then, the UN has been spearheading events aimed 
at sustaining the environment. 
It must be noted, however, that decades of environmental governance have 
achieved abysmal results. The ozone layer keeps on depleting, climate change is 
becoming more pronounced and biodiversity keeps on shrinking. On the policy 
arena, regulations to sustain the environment have been limited due to partisan 
economic interest whiles there is little commitment to the development of 
workable rules for the extraction of environmental resources. Again, compliance 
has become an issue since there is little incentive for compliance. That is, there 
has been little efforts towards the enforcement of negotiations, agreements and 
regulations making it difficult to achieve desired environmental outcomes. 
Within this framework of uncertainties and failure, the question this paper tries 
to respond to is: how can we achieve effective environmental governance?  
The paper is divided into two main sections. The first section presents a brief 
exposition on environmental governance by elucidating its main dimensions and 
challenges. The second section of the paper proposes a possible way forward for 
environmental governance through the lens of political ecology (and ecological 
economics). It proposes multi-level governance with institutional and regulatory 
reforms, full participation of marginalised groups, integrated environmental 
planning and valorisation of the environment. This section does this by 
critiquing the mainstream environmental governance through explanations of 
the reasons for failures and proposing broad strategies to be adopted by formal 
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environmental managers for conserving the environment for itself and no other 
else.  
2.0 Dimensions of Environmental Governance 
Environmental governance refers to ―the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms 
and organisations through which political actors influence environmental actions 
and outcomes‖ (Lemos and Agrawal 2006: 298). It is the constellation of 
environmental actors, policies, regulations, processes and mechanisms at both 
domestic and global scales with the collective objective of achieving 
environmental sustainability. From the definition above, one can discern three 
umbrella dimensions of environmental governance including organisations, 
regulations and mechanisms;   
2.1 Organisations  
There are a lot of actors in environmental governance ranging from national and 
international organisations to environmental non-governmental organisations 
(ENGOs) – including civil societies. Sovereign states have served as the conduit 
of environmental actions through the attendance of environmental conferences, 
international negotiations, signing of Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs – formal inter-state agreements), implementation of these treaties, and 
enactment and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.  
Aside from states, the major international organisations involved in 
environmental governance are United Nations (UN) agencies and programmes. 
One of the major offshoots of the Stockholm conference in 1972 was the 
establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) ―to play 
the lead role in [global environmental governance] by coordinating 
environmental activities within the UN agencies and acting as a catalyst for new 
initiatives‖ (ibid.). Aside from the UNEP, there are other UN organisations such 
as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD), and the secretariats of the MEAs (Najam et al. 2004). Other 
environmentally related organisations include the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
[ibid.]. Together, the UN has formed an Environmental Management Group 
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(EMG) consisting of 44 bodies concerned with the crafting of rules, supervising 
and providing funding for the ‗sustenance‘ of the human environment (Ivanova 
and Roy 2007).  
Apart from these two major categories, cooperate bodies have been an intrinsic 
part of the governance regime through participation in environmental 
negotiations, private-public partnerships towards environmental sanity and 
Cooperate Social Responsibilities (CSR) (Ivanova et al. 2007; Dauvergne and 
Lister 2012). Similarly, Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations have 
become the largest category of organisations with the ―largest impact on 
environmental governance‖ (Najam et al. 2004: 24). They take active part in 
conferences and negotiations and create public awareness on environmental 
hazards and best practices (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002). For instance, 
NGOS served as part of government delegations as representatives of civil 
societies or ―think tanks‖ giving technical backstopping. International NGOs 
such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Foundation for 
International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), Center for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL) and Greenpeace have assisted the 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) ―with policy advice and scientific backup 
in the climate negotiations and FIELD lawyers have frequently obtained 
accreditation as members of small islands delegations‖ (Gulbrandsen and 
Andresen 2004: p. 56). They also serve as a major check on the state and 
businesses through the insistence on the adherence to environmental regulations, 
principles and treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol (see Gulbrandsen and 
Andresen 2004).  
Following the above are the epistemic communities concerned with the 
production of knowledge on the environment and assisting in designing technical 
solutions for curbing environmental externalities. Mention can also be made of 
the local communities who directly manage natural resources through the use of 
indigenous technologies. Though local communities are recognised as peripheral 
to mainstream environmental governance, their immense contribution cannot be 
overemphasised.   
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2.2 Regulations  
These consist of international and domestic policies, laws, norms and documents 
used as instruments of governance. They include national and sub-national laws 
and policies, cooperate environmental policies and a plethora of international 
reports, treaties and agreements that together regulate the use of the commons. 
In particular, MEAs ―have been the primary vehicle‖ for the achievement of 
global cooperation on environmental issues (Sampford 2002; 82). Together, more 
than 1700 international agreements (including about 500 MEAs) have been 
―brokered‖ to resolve environmental crises (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Pelletier 
2010; Mitchell 2003). Notable among these are the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution; Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer; 
Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal; Rio Declaration (Earth Charter); United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; Convention on Biological Diversity; Kyoto 
Protocol; Declaration on the Forest; and Doha Declaration (adapted from 
Goffman 2005). The nomenclatures of these treaties are axiomatic of the 
respective regulatory functions they perform. Other influential documents are 
the Brundtland Commission report (1987) and Agenda 21 (1992); serving as the 
rudders of mainstream environmental governance.  
2.3 Mechanisms  
The UN uses various mechanisms to propagate the message of sustainable 
development and as tools for environmental governance. Some of these 
governance mechanisms have been highlighted and explained under this section.  
Starting from 1972, the UN organises decadal conferences for environmental 
actors to meet and deliberate on the state of the ecology, and make treaties and 
negotiations. The first of these conferences was held in Stockholm (Sweden), the 
second in Nairobi (Kenya) in 1982, the third was held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 
in 1992 while the fourth and fifth were held in Johannesburg (South Africa) in 
2002 and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in (2012) respectively (see also Seyfang 2003). 
Aside from these mage-conferences, there are other conferences and meetings 
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held on particular ecological resources and treaties. These serve as the platform 
for review and drawing of schemas for environmental sustainability.    
Moreover, the UN uses market-based and voluntary agreements to manage 
resource use in member countries. These are incentive-based and voluntary 
mechanisms usually used at the meso-level to regulate the use of natural 
resources, and have grown spectacularly in recent years (see Jordan et. al 2003). 
They include ―ecotaxes and subsidies based on a mix of regulation and market 
incentives, voluntary agreements, certification, ecolabeling, and informational 
systems‖ (Lemos and Agrawal 2006:305). Ecotaxes mainly on environmentally 
sensitive activities and services such as highly-pollutant industrial activities, 
energy, agriculture and tourism, are enacted to regulate the use of such services 
and take into account the cost of their externalities (ibid.). Prominent among 
certifications and ecolabeling is timber certification that helps to regulate 
logging – especially in developing countries. Again, through the polluter pays 
principle, carbon trading has become a global bargain mechanism for the 
regulation of global emissions from the industrialised world (Atkinson 2008).  
Voluntary trade agreements are also made between national and cooperate 
bodies for the latter to conform to regulations on pollution (Lemos and Agrawal 
2006).  
Lastly, to provide a source of assistance as well as incentives for adherence to 
MEAs, donor countries have tied some development aid with environmental 
conditionalities. Aside from this, the international community has established 
funds to help achieve environmental sustainability. One of these is the Global 
Environment Fund (GEF) which has become a major fund for environmental 
protection (for related schemes see Pearce 2004). In fact, Rist (2008) indicates 
that about $125 billion per year is paid to fund environmental ‗protection‘. 
Through this mechanism, countries (especially from the Global South) are 
incentivised to comply with MEAs and enforce domestic environmental 
regulations.  
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3.0 Major Challenges to Existing Environmental Governance Regime 
Five decades of (global) environmental governance has achieved little since the 
natural environment keeps on deteriorating. For instance, the Millennium 
Ecosystems Assessment (2005) painted a rather gloomy picture of the state of the 
world‘s ecosystems by indicating that anthropogenic degradation is affecting 
about 60% of ecosystem services, pointing to the hiatuses in current mainstream 
environmental governance. Moreover, at the recent Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro (2012), participating Heads of States and Representatives acknowledged 
this failure by indicating that ―the 20 years since the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development in 1992 have seen uneven progress‖ (UN 2012: 
4). This failure can be attributed to numerous challenges ranging from 
institutional to ideological. The gravest institutional challenges include those 
discussed below;  
The major issue militating against environmental governance is weaknesses in 
its institutional structure at the global level. The UNEP which is to play the 
leading role in this affair has little power within the UN bureaucracy. As just a 
programme, competition with powerful agencies such as the World Bank, WTO 
and the International Monetary Fund for the primacy of environmental concerns 
in the core UN agenda has been problematic. Due to these asymmetrical 
relations within the UN, the UNEP ―has never been given the resources or the 
political capital to fulfil its mandate‖ (Najam et al. 2006: 15). This problem has 
attained much gravity with the takeover of environmental responsibilities by 
these powerful agencies (Haas 2004; Gehring and Buck 2002; Downie and Levy 
2000).  
Again, the gargantuan number of environmental institutions in the UN and 
outside, coupled with institutional fragmentation, and proliferation and 
duplication of MEAs, has made the UNEP overloaded and incapacitated to 
ensure efficient institutional cooperation and coordination for better governance 
(Ivanova and Roy 2007). For instance, with over 500 MEAs and their secretariats 
scattered around the globe, it has become difficult for the UNEP and even 
nation-states to streamline activities for better governance.  
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Following the above is the issue of lopsided environmental negotiations and non-
compliance (i.e. lack of political will for enforcement). Firstly, environmental 
negotiations are made with the lowest-common-denominator on a single-issue 
basis, to ensure that the interests of most states are represented (Margerum 
1996; Sampford 2002). Sovereign states can, and, hold veto in negotiations that 
will limit their economic activities. The holding of veto by the US in the UNCED 
(United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) processes in 
1992 and her withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 due to its industrial 
interests are notable examples (Pelling 2008; Atkinson 2008). Thus ―politically 
feasible reduction targets achieved through problem shifting end-of-pipe 
technologies are favoured over precautionary solutions, fundamental changes in 
production systems and hard limits on total allowable emissions‖ (Pelletier 2010: 
222). This affects the contents of MEAs since economic growth and political 
expediency tramp environmental quality in such negotiations.  
Secondly, there is lack of political will on the part of sovereign states to comply 
with MEAs for economic reasons, scientific uncertainties and scepticisms 
associated with environmental prognoses – plus, there are no serious 
international efforts for enforcement leading to free-riding (Najam et. al. 2006). 
The free-rider problem has led to widespread non-compliance even among the 
industrialised countries (the major pollutants of the earth). For instance, a 
research by Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000a) reveals that industrialised 
countries are violating environmental regulations they spearheaded the UN to 
formulate. Again, studies by Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000b) to evaluate the 
implementation of specific sustainability policies in the industrialised world 
reveal a widespread inaction among countries such as Australia, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, Japan, US, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Germany and other 
European countries. An earlier research by these authors also revealed that The 
non-compliance on the side of the supposed ‗mentors‘ and ‗propagators‘ of 
environmental sustainability has therefore affected the implementation of MEAs 
as ‗mentee-states‘ have also relented on their efforts to comply with MEAs.   
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The challenges above, coupled with their derivatives (which will be occurring in 
subsequent sections of this paper) and the lack of holistic and/or interdependent 
agreement(s) on all aspects of the ecology to take into consideration inter-
linkages and complexities in the environment (O‘Connor 2008), are militating 
against environmental governance, resulting in persistent degradation of the 
natural environment. There is therefore a need to reform the current system to 
achieve better results. 
 
4.0 A Way Forward.  
The numerous problems combatting environmental governance are to be dealt 
with if the rapid degradation in environmental governance is to be curtailed. 
Thus, this section of the article proceeds to offer a possible set of measures that 
can be adopted by leaders for environmental governance to be effective. These 
measures include a change in the existing level of governance to a multi-level 
governance; institutional reforms; participatory governance; integrated 
environmental planning; regulatory reforms and valorisation of the Environment 
4.1 Towards a Multi-level Governance 
The search for alternatives to curb the inherent weaknesses within the 
institutional framework for environmental governance coupled with non-
compliance to MEAs has generated polemic debates in academic circles. Some 
scholars are calling for a World Environmental Organisation (WEO), parallel to 
the WTO, in order to centralise environmental governance, ensure strict 
compliance with MEAs and impose sanctions on free-riders (Biermann 2000; 
2001; 2002; 2007; Biermann and Bauer 2005; Pelletier 2010; Charnovitz 2002; 
Esty 1994; Whalley and Zissimos 2002). However, others vehemently oppose this 
proposition by indicating that there is lack of political feasibility for a WEO since 
nation-states see its establishment as pernicious to their entrenched sovereignty 
(see Najam 2003; Hass 2004). From the perspectives of political ecology and 
political economy, the idea of WEO seems ideal, but becomes more complicated 
when environmental governance itself is unpacked. For instance, the 
complexities involved in the management of the environment make monocentric 
governance a less viable option. The environment consists of several components 
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covering a very large area making it very complex for one organisation to 
manage effectively. Again, there is high possibility that such a superstructure 
will be captured by the powerful nations to advance their economic interest 
whilst limiting that of weaker nations through eco-imperialism. Just as the WTO, 
powerful nations will deploy their agencies to use such a mega structure to 
restrict the use of the environment by less powerful ones for their partisan gain.    
The above therefore calls for a more nuanced governance regime incorporating 
complexity, political, and compliance concerns and capable of addressing key 
flaws – that is, a Multi-Level Governance (MLG) or network governance.  
Multi-Level Governance refers to ―political structures and processes that 
transgress the borders of administrative jurisdictions, aiming to cope with 
interdependencies in societal development and political decision making which 
exists among territorial units‖ (Benz 2006: 95). This network model will comprise 
of ―formally independent, yet mutually interacting governance levels, which can 
be distributed either vertically or horizontally‖ with active and full participation 
of all non-state actors (Newig and Fritsch 2009: 199; see also Paavola 2007; Benn 
et. al. 2009; Streck 2002; Heuer 2012). Such a collaborative governance regime 
has three major characteristics – it is ―non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and post-
territorial‖ (Karkkainen 2004: 75: emphasis in original). That is, it should bring 
on board all environmental stakeholders (states and non-state actors) through a 
system of created actor-equality with veracious concerns for the ecology that 
transcends sovereignty but with high legitimacy. An econometric-cum-empirical 
analysis by Newig and Fritch indicates that such a ―system comprising many 
agencies and levels of governance yields higher environmental outputs than 
rather monocentric governance‖ (2009: 210; see also Waddell 2000; Selsky and 
Parker 2005; Starik and Heuer 2002; Heuer 2010). 
In a sharp contrast to the establishment of a superstructure, the feasibility of a 
Multi-Level Governance is epitomised in the nascent emergence of 
environmental governance from a state-centric affair to a more participatory and 
collaborative governance (see Najam et. al. 2004; Haas 2004; Sanwal 2004; 
Bulkeley and Mol 2003). However, the major constraints to the emergent regime 
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are the lack of coordination and the subjugation of less powerful actors such as 
poor countries and local communities. Thus, here, MLG will only ―involve the 
streamlining and improvement of existing governance efforts rather than 
creating new governance bodies‖ (Haas 2004: 8). What is needed here is an 
invigorated agency serving as a ―switchboard institution‖ (ibid.) to connect and 
coordinate activities and policies and to ensure that the interests of marginalised 
actors are represented. With this governance system in place, the practical 
recommendations below could help improve environmental governance; 
4.2 Institutional Reform  
There is  the need to upgrade and invigorate the UNEP from its current status 
as a programme to a UN agency that can command the needed human, financial, 
political and technological resources to achieve its mandate efficiently and serve 
as a global switchboard institution for stakeholder management (see Najam et al 
2006; Najam et al. 2004). Again, regional level switchboard institutions are also 
needed for regional coordination. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) is doing well in networking for environmental governance (see Lian 
and Robinson 2002; Elliott 2011) and more are needed to achieve holistic 
environmental sustainability. Thus, existing regional-level agencies such as the 
European Union and the African Union must also take up these environmental 
networking roles for the betterment of the earth. Moreover, with the enabling 
environment for MLG already in place, there is the need for improvement in the 
capacities of actors to perform their functions more effectively and efficiently. 
The state in particular must perform the lead role through the devolution of 
some core functions to decentralised institutions. Again, the capacities of sub-
national actors should be built (financially and technically) to identify 
environmental concerns and act accordingly. 
4.3 Full Participation of the Marginalised (Local Communities and NGOs).   
Political economists and political ecologists indicate that the emergent 
environmental governance system is an effort to thwart the development of the 
poor (see Goldman 1998). This is because local communities, especially forest 
people are usually (and ironically) touted as sources of degradation and thus 
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must be stopped (Adams 2009). However, research indicate that local 
communities have systems of managing common-pool resources more effectively 
(see Ostrom 1990; 2009; Ostrom et. al. 1999) and that degradation are mostly 
exacerbated by bad governance (Jarosz 1996). For instance a study by Robbins 
(2012) in Rajasthan in India about common property forests found that some 
actors degraded forest due to their dissatisfaction with governance structures. 
His conclusion was that ―degradation and marginalisation are interrelated, but 
mediated by local power relations‖ (ibid: 74). Similarly, my research into the 
political ecology of forest management at the local level in Ghana revealed that 
forest communities and dwellers (less powerful actors who are the actual 
managers of the forest) are marginalised in forest use and control (Otutei 2012; 
2014). This results in resistance from these less powerful actors through 
unsustainable practices such as arson and destruction of young economic trees. 
Again, according to Kull (1999; 2004), the criminalisation of traditional slash and 
burn methods of farming in Madagascar as a forest governance mechanism has 
worsened the degradation plight of the country. Here, farmers set fires on their 
farms and blame them on some ―evil people‖. These studies have consistently 
provided evidence that without these bad governance strategies from 
conventional (formal) management regimes, forest people would have managed 
natural resources better.  
Aside from marginalising local communities and local people in the governance 
process, there have been concerns of side-lining NGOs in final negotiations and 
procedures of compliance. Commenting on the participation of NGOs in 
negotiating the Kyoto rules, Gulbrandsen and Andresen revealed that:  
―While NGOs have been formally accredited as observers to the climate 
change negotiations since the talks began in 1991, actual participation in 
the negotiations has in practice varied widely, and has usually been 
restricted to the following forms: access to the conference venue, presence 
during meetings, interventions during debate, face-to-face lobbying of 
delegations, and distribution of documents. Somewhat paradoxically, most 
of the final negotiations of the compliance procedure, where most 
delegates agreed on the need for transparency, were conducted behind 
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closed doors. Although participation does not equal influence, it was 
certainly a drawback for the green NGOs to be shut out from important 
forums. NGOs therefore had to rely on traditional ―corridor politics,‖ face-
to-face lobbying and distribution of documents during session breaks‖ 
(2004: p. 59). 
This implies formal environmental managers have been undermining local 
communities and NGOs – actors with genuine concern for the environment – so 
as to achieve their partisan interest of sustained unrestricted economic 
development. Local people and NGOs have been made peripheral actors in 
Environmental governance.  
Thus for environmental governance to be successful through the multi-level 
governance regime, there should be collaborations between formal 
environmental governors such as states and businesses on the one hand and 
local communities and NGOs on the other hand. Evidence in the forestry sector 
indicates that there is emergent collaborative forest management in countries 
such as India, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Ghana and others (FAO 1999). However, 
this has become exploitative since communities become marginalised in such 
collaborations leading to vehement resistance from local communities, especially 
in forest areas (Adams 2009; Adger et. al 2001). Thus in this MLG system, there 
is the need to incorporate the interests of these local communities and delegate 
the management of some ecological resources (especially forests) to them to avoid 
conflicts and achieve better results because as Elinor Ostrom (op. cit.) indicates, 
local communities (with their indigenous knowledge) can manage these 
resources better. 
4.4 Integrated environmental planning 
The interconnectivity in the natural ecology demands comprehensive 
management strategies. Thus integrated environmental planning should be a 
major tool in MLGs (Sampford 2002). States and non-states actors in this regime 
must collaborate to draw up integrated management plans at the domestic level 
to be harmonised at the global scale for a composite plan of action covering all 
aspects of the environment. This will help to deal with single-issue based 
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negotiations and strategies. Again, the implementation of such an Integrated 
Plan should be monitored and evaluated annually to track progress and ensure 
compliance.  
4.5 Regulatory reforms 
Intrinsic to MLG is the commitment of all actors (especially states) to ensure 
compliance to MEAs and environmental policies. However, for such an 
assumption to hold, MEAs should be streamlined and managed effectively since 
the proliferation and fragmentation of treaties have become a recipe for mediocre 
performance (Hass 2004). This could be achieved by grouping related MEAs 
under parent treaties and secretariats and maintaining interdependence and 
congruence among them. Again, there should be a shift from the lowest-common-
denominator mantra to MEAs that reflect actual environmental concerns. More 
studies are also needed to ascertain the veracity of apocalyptic predictions to do 
away with cynicisms that have been the main refuge for free-riders.  
Moreover, mega-conferences should move away from the endemic negotiation 
stage to ensuring implementation of and compliance with MEAs. There should 
be the creation of positive incentives for ecocentric states while strictly punitive 
sanctions should be meted out to free-riders (including hegemonic states in the 
Global North). Conferences should also serve as platforms for evaluating the 
implementation of MEAs and the Integrated Plan proposed earlier to address 
anomalies and chart the way forward. Finally, UNEP should create a mechanism, 
modelled after that of the WTO, for settling inter- and intra-state disputes that 
may arise in such strict enforcement of environmental regulations.  
4.6 Valorisation of the Environment 
Central to every governance regime should be the acknowledgement of the 
protection of the environment as a compulsion. However mainstream 
environmental governance, predicated on environmental economics and 
ecological modernisation, has long ignored this. Environmental economists hold 
that ―capitalism accelerates environmental degradation for a while...but then 
leads to much higher levels of environmental quality if growth is allowed to 
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continue‖ (McCarthy 2004:327). Similarly, ecological modernisation indicates 
that ―the ongoing, internal dynamics of capitalist modernity can be harnessed to 
improve environmental quality‖ (ibid:328). These ideological perspectives 
combined, the underlying assumption of mainstream environmental governance 
is that ―human ingenuity will always lead to novel substitutes for increasingly 
scarce resources, and that free markets will ensure that, as specific resources 
become depleted, rising prices will prevent their over-exploitation‖ (Pelletier 
2010:223). This has been the premise of institutions such as the World Bank and 
WTO and thus neoliberalism has taken centre stage in environmental 
governance, followed by the pursuit of technological solutions to treat just the 
symptoms of degradation, without tackling the major sources of such 
degradation (ibid; Gareau 2008).  
Consequently, developmental concerns have taken primacy in environmental 
governance. The incessant quest for everlasting growth has resulted in the 
subordination of environmental concerns in environmental governance to that of 
development (Escobar 1996; Rist 2008). In the words of Najam et al (2004:29), 
―environmental governance is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end, which 
has to be the attainment of sustainable development‖. This is epitomised in the 
names of the succeeding mega-conferences on the environment: the 1972 
conference was UN Conference on the Human Environment, that of 1992 was 
UN Conference on Environment and Development, that of 2002 conference was 
World Summit on Sustainable Development whiles that of 2012 conference was 
the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD). To 
Najam (2005: 313), ―the nomenclature of these mega-conferences is not just of 
semantic importance, it demonstrates a significant evolution in the very content 
of what constitutes the substance of global environmental governance‖. It must 
be noted that sustainable development itself is officially defined as ―development 
[not environment] that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs‖ (Brundtland 1987:43). 
Furthermore, at the recent Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (2012), it was 
resolved by participants that  
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―We recognize that poverty eradication, changing unsustainable and 
promoting sustainable patterns of consumption and production and 
protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social 
development are the overarching objectives of and essential requirements 
for sustainable development. We also reaffirm the need to achieve 
sustainable development by promoting sustained, inclusive and equitable 
economic growth, creating greater opportunities for all, reducing 
inequalities, raising basic standards of living, fostering equitable social 
development and inclusion, and promoting integrated and sustainable 
management of natural resources and ecosystems that supports, inter alia, 
economic, social and human development while facilitating ecosystem 
conservation, regeneration and restoration and resilience in the face of 
new and emerging challenges.‖ (UN 2012: 2) 
The above clearly indicates that the environment has been and is still a subject 
of economic development and all efforts are still towards economic development 
with little emphasis on the welfare of nature. To this end, even MEAs 
negotiations are ―regularly monitored to ensure that they do not contravene 
WTO rules‖ (Pelletier 2010: 225).  
However, ecological economists indicate that this presumption is devastative 
since the earth has a finite capacity and any production (whether for 
consumption or as an alternative to natural resources) leads to entropy (waste) 
(ibid). Thus, technological solutions will just exacerbate environmental 
degradation. Again, the postulation of environmental economists is flawed 
because empirical evidence indicates that there is large and incessant growth in 
calculated ―ecological footprints‖ in industrialised (highly capitalist) countries 
with more pronounced adverse impacts on the global environment (Stern 2001). 
Thus, the persistent growth of the hegemonic capitalist paradigm without any 
limitations will eventually push humankind to the brink of ecological collapse 
due to forecasted high industrial anthropogenic degradation, even in the current 
‗less-polluted‘ Third World.  
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Hence, the underlying ideologies of mainstream environmental governance need 
to change to embrace a rather ecocentric presumption that will help sustain the 
planet. In fact, sustainable development is an evil in itself and therefore must be 
abolished. With environmental concern taking primacy of such a regime, 
precautionary strategies should be implemented to halt human activities that 
degrade the natural environment; including malign scientific and technological 
exploration. Such strategies call for a radical shift from the current neoliberal 
orthodoxy (that is, sustainable development) to regarding environmental 
carrying capacities and their limitations as a major constraint to development. 
In fact, Rist (2008: 182) concludes that ―from the point of view of environmental 
protection, sustainable development is the evil in itself‖ (emphasis in original) 
and thus must be dealt with. 
Thus environmental values should be the major indicators of development. There 
should be concerted efforts to manage materialistic values to ensure that they 
are subordinate to environmental values. Research indicates that this will be a 
more effective way of arresting unsustainable practices (see Sampford 1991; 
1995; 2001; 2002; Sampford and Wood, 1993).  
 
5.0 Conclusion 
Environmental governance has attained momentum since the past four decades 
but with abysmal results due to challenges such as institutional weaknesses, 
inactions, contempocentrism and anthropocentrism and the general disregard of 
environmental limits. Contempocentrism as used here refers to the ―tendency to 
disregard the welfare of future generations and believe in the power of 
technology and technological change to take care of environmental degradation 
and scarcities‖ (Lemos and Agrawal 2006: 309). Due to the above, there has been 
a deliberate shift in the focus of environmental governance from the environment 
to development. Thus, instead of making radical changes in the prevailing 
capitalist production systems (the main culprit of ecological degradation), 
environmental governance is just concerned with palliative measures to sustain 
these systems through ‗green washing‘ and ‗blue washing‘ under the guise of 
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‗sustainable development‘. This shift, coupled with institutional weaknesses, has 
become the recipe for poor results.  
However, above I have argued that in order to effectively achieve environmental 
governance, we must strengthen the emergent participatory system through 
Multi-Level Governance by invigorating the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP), streamlining MEAs and improving the capacities of the 
existing institutions and ensuring full participation of local communities. Again, 
serious efforts are to be put in place to ensure compliance to streamlined MEAs 
at the national level, whiles integrated environmental planning at both domestic 
and global levels should be a major tool in the governance process. Another area 
of serious concern should be the full participation of indigenous people and direct 
dependants of natural resources in the governance process at the micro and 
meso-levels. The most important, however, should be the valorisation of the 
environment as the nexus of environmental governance. The concerns of the 
environment have been relegated to the background subject only to the 
achievement of developmental objectives. However, if environmental governance 
is to be effective and yield results, the environment itself should be valorised.  
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